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Abstract 
According to the development approach to exchange rates, competitive currencies have 
been a key factor in most East and Southeast Asian successful growth strategies. There 
is also today an important empirical literature that relates overvaluations to low per 
capita growth rates. While the econometric literature on this issue is relatively rich, 
theoretical analysis of channels through which real exchange rate levels could affect 
economic development are very scarce. This paper intends to contribute to this debate 
by bringing more theoretical elements to the connections between real exchange rate 
levels and economic development and by providing new econometric evidence for the 
negative effects of overvaluations on growth. 
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Resumo 
De  acordo  com  a  abordagem  do  desenvolvimento  econômico  em  relação  à  taxa  de 
câmbio, uma das explicações do sucesso das experiências no Leste e Sudeste Asiático 
estaria também na condução de suas políticas cambiais, notadamente no que diz respeito 
à prática constante de taxas competitivas. Existe também hoje uma crescente literatura 
empírica que procura investigar as relações entre níveis da taxa de câmbio e taxas de 
crescimento  econômico.  Apesar  da  literatura  econométrica  a  respeito  do  tema  ser 
relativamente rica, análises teóricas em relação aos canais de influência do câmbio no 
processo de desenvolvimento são bem mais escassas. Esse trabalho objetiva contribuir 
para esse debate trazendo mais elementos teóricos para essa possível conexão, além de 
oferecer novas evidências empíricas para os efeitos negativos da sobrevalorização do 
câmbio no crescimento econômico. 
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Introduction 
According to the development approach to currency management, competitive exchange 
rates  have  been  a  key  factor  in  most  East  and  Southeast  Asian  successful  growth 
strategies in the last 30 years. More recently, several other countries have also followed 
this  path.  Chile,  Uganda  and  Mauritius  in  the  eighties  and  India  and  China  in  the 
nineties have all benefited from competitive real exchange rates, which fostered exports 
and output growth. Most Latin American and African countries, on the other hand, have 
suffered from severe balance of payment crises due to exchange rate overvaluation. 
Chile and Mexico in the early eighties, as well as Mexico, Brazil and Argentina in the 
nineties are good examples.  
Following  the  traditional  Keynesian  macroeconomic  channel,  an  expansionary 
devaluation boosts exports, income and employment. Exchange rate management may 
also have strong impacts on aggregate savings as it influences paths of consumption and 
investment  via  real  wage  determination
2.  An  excessively  overvalued  currency  could 
cause savings displacement. By stimulating the export sector, a relatively undervalued 
currency may help to avert financial crises and put the economy in a more sustained 
developmental path. It is an important tool to promote the development of the tradable 
sector, which is usually very dynamic and contributes to innovations and productivity 
increases. Exchange rate policy may therefore be important to avoid Dutch disease
3. 
Numerous  studies  have  argued  that  most  balance  of  payments  crises  are  related  to 
overvalued or misaligned currencies
4. 
There is also today an important empirical literature that relates per capita growth rates 
to real exchange rate levels. Many works find negative correlations between exchange 
rate misalignment and growth for a long list of developing countries since the seventies; 
the more overvalued the currency, the smaller the per capita growth rates
5. Other studies 
have found positive correlations between growth and undervalued currencies measured 
as  accumulation  of  foreign  exchange  reserves,  a  result  that  seems  to  suggest  an 
important relationship between growth and exchange rate levels
6. A recurrent issue in 
this  empirical  literature  is  the  relative  undervaluation  of  the  Asian  currencies  as 
compared to Latin American and African ones for the period 1970 to 1999
7. In most 
works,  a  lower  currency  level  for  Asian  countries  emerges,  which  appears  to  be  a 
regional pattern. For the Latin American and African cases, the pattern seems to be the 
opposite and overvaluation cycles are very common. 
While  the  empirical  literature  on  this  issue  is  relatively  rich,  theoretical  analysis  of 
channels through which real exchange rate levels could affect economic growth and 
development are very scarce. Most works tend to concentrate on issues of exchange rate 
measurement,  concepts  of  equilibrium  and  indications  of  misalignment,  leaving  the 
theoretical issues aside. The literature on exchange rate policy cases concentrates itself 
on  country  experiences,  dedicating  also  little  attention  to  how  overvaluations  or 
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undervaluations may impact on growth. The only literature that briefly mentions these 
theoretical aspects is a recent one that deals with policy advice
8.  
This paper intends to contribute to the debate by bringing more theoretical elements and 
providing  new  econometric  evidence  to  the  connections between  real  exchange  rate 
levels and development. One possible contribution of this work would then be the focus 
on macro programming aspects of development, instead of the more traditional trade 
and  industrial  policy  issues.  The  work  is  divided  into  5  sections.  Section  1  is  the 
introduction. Section 2 briefly presents possible long term effects of real exchange rate 
levels  on  growth  through  two  main  channels:  technological  upgrading  and  capital 
accumulation. Section 3 deals with the relationship between real exchange rate levels 
and investment in the short run. It is shown that, for given productivity levels, the real 
exchange rate may play an important role in determining real wages, profitability and 
capital accumulation. Section 4 presents the econometric analysis and section 5 reports 
some  brief  conclusions  of  the  paper  referring  to  the  debate  that  deals  with  Latin 
American and East Asian development strategies. 
Long term effects of real exchange rate levels 
Two important channels through which exchange rate levels affect long term growth are 
related to investment and technological change. By affecting real wages, exchange rate 
levels  influence  aggregate  savings,  investment  and foreign  debt  dynamics.  As  some 
authors  have  demonstrated,  in  capital  account  liberalization  processes  with  strong 
inflows,  what  usually  happens  is  currency  overvaluation  which  increases  the 
consumption  of  tradable  goods.  The  artificially  high  real  wages  caused  by  the 
appreciation of the currency stimulates consumption in the country that receives the 
inflows. Debt is used to finance consumption instead of generating resources to repay it, 
causing what can be characterized as savings displacement
9. The increase in external 
borrowing  eventually  generates  unsustainable  debt  dynamics  and  the  result  of  those 
cycles is a balance of payments crisis. 
Overvalued currencies have also strong profit squeezing effects in the tradable sector, 
which usually bring investment rates down. Undervalued currencies tend, on the other 
hand,  to  be  associated  with  higher  investment  levels  at  the  macro  level.  Based  on 
Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) it is possible to show in a Keynesian framework how an 
undervalued currency contributes to investment and capital accumulation as discussed 
in  the  next  section.  If  we  define  an  investment  function  that  depends  on  capacity 
utilization  and  on  profit  margins  and  a  consumption  function  that  depends  on  real 
wages,  the  real  exchange  rate  level  can  be  indirectly  introduced  in  the  capital 
accumulation process.  
For given productivity levels, the real exchange rate defines the level of real wages by 
setting the relative prices of tradables to non tradables; a relatively appreciated currency 
meaning  lower  tradable  prices,  higher  real  wages,  lower  profit  margins,  higher 
consumption  and  lower  investment  and  a  relatively  undervalued  currency  meaning 
higher tradable prices, lower real wage levels, higher profit margins and investment. In 
the  latter  case,  an  undervaluation  would  also  contribute  to  more  employment  and 
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investment by increasing capacity utilization through higher exports. With sufficiently 
elastic investment and export responses, the economy would get into an investment-led 
pattern of growth. Overvaluations would reduce employment and investment. 
It is also possible to investigate the shortcomings of low investment levels at the macro 
level due to overvaluations from a technological perspective. Excessively appreciated 
currencies affect mostly the profitability of investments in the manufacturing (tradable) 
sector  where  increasing  returns  are  ubiquitous.  By  relocating  resources  to  non-
manufacturing  sectors,  especially  non-tradable  activities  and  commodity  production, 
where decreasing returns rule, overvaluations affect negatively the overall productivity 
dynamics  of  the  economy.  Undervaluations,  on  the  other  hand,  tend  to  boost 
profitability and investment in increasing returns sectors. 
From  a  Kaldorian  perspective,  the  real  exchange  rate  level  is,  thus,  a  key  variable 
affecting development in an open economy environment. By defining the relative prices 
of  tradables  to  non-tradables  and,  therefore,  the  level  of  profitability  in  most 
manufacturing industries, the real exchange rate determines which sectors are viable or 
not.  In  a  developing  economy,  intense  overvaluations  tend  to  shut  down  whole 
industries,  blocking  the  channel  of  productivity  increases  in  the  overall  economy 
through the relocation of abundant labor from low-earning and low-productivity jobs to 
high-earning  and  high-productivity  jobs  in  manufacturing.  In  Kaldorian  terms, 
overvaluations  may  impede  developing  economies  to  reach  a  “mature”  state  where 
surplus labor has been  exhausted. Relative undervaluations may, on the other hand, 
contribute to productivity increases by integrating workers in increasing returns sectors, 
avoiding the problems raised by the Dutch disease literature. 
By stimulating these non-traditional industries, a competitive exchange rate may be able 
to  change  non-price  characteristics  of  goods  in  the  sense  of  changing  exports  and 
imports elasticities as Barbosa-Filho (2006) argues. If the country is able to move from 
traditional commodity production to manufacturing for world markets by the help of a 
competitive  currency  then  exchange  rate  policy  may  promote  better  “non-price 
characteristics” of goods and higher productivity levels. The framework is Kaldorian 
here, thus, in the sense that increasing returns is assumed in manufacturing production 
(or non traditional commodity related tradables) and by stimulating those industries a 
competitive currency may help increasing productivity. 
On technological grounds, an adequate exchange rate policy can, thus, help stimulate 
the non traditional tradable sector of developing economies, particularly the ones related 
to export manufactures. As Williamson (2003) argues in his “development approach” to 
exchange rates, a competitive currency would provide stimulus for the development of a 
non commodity dependent tradable sector, therefore avoiding Dutch disease problems 
and  premature  deindustrialization
10.  By  stimulating  the  production  of  industrial 
manufactures to the world markets, a competitive exchange rate would help developing 
countries  to  climb  up  the  technological  ladder.  Learning  by  doing  and  cumulative 
technological progress would depend heavily on the development of the manufacturing 
sector
11. The argument is especially relevant for resource-rich countries. Appreciated 
currency  levels  originating  from  high  commodity  exports  would  prevent  the 
development  of  an  industrial  sector  with  its  related  economies  of  scale  and 
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technological  spill-overs.  In  this  sense,  by  avoiding  overvaluations,  exchange  rate 
policy could work as an effective industrial policy tool. 
To sum up, following all those approaches, competitive exchange rates would avoid 
savings displacement and contribute to capital accumulation by stimulating investment. 
On technological grounds, it would encourage the development of the non traditional 
tradable  sector,  helping  countries  go  through  structural  change  and  climb  up  the 
technological ladder. By increasing productivity, the development of a dynamic non 
traditional tradable sector could also increase real wages, counteracting the negative 
effects of a weak currency for workers. 
Effects of real exchange rate levels on aggregate investment 
One of the most important real effects of exchange rate levels in long term growth is on 
aggregate investment. Based on Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) we can show in formal 
terms how a competitive currency may increase investment, savings and thus stimulate 
capital accumulation. By defining an aggregate investment function that depends on 
capacity utilization and on profit margins and a consumption function that depends on 
real wages, it is possible to set up a macro model where savings and investment levels 
are a function of real wages and, thus, real exchange rate levels. 
We  start,  following  Bhaduri  and  Marglin  (1990),  with  a  savings  function  S   that 
depends on a fixed share  s of capitalists’ profits. Workers don’t save in so far as they 
consume all their income. 
* *) / )( / ( Y Y Y Y R s sR S = =   (1) 
where  R  is the capitalists’ income and  * Y  potential output. By defining  Y R h / =  as 
the capitalists’ share of total income,  * /Y Y z =  as capacity utilization and normalizing 
potential output   1 * = Y , we have: 
shz S =           (2) 
0 1 > > h          (2.1) 
0 1 > > z          (2.2) 
By following a traditional mark-up pricing rule, we can define profit margins or mark-
ups as follows:  
1 ) / ( − = bw p m       (3) 
where  p  is the price level,  w the nominal wage,  b / 1  the productivity level and  m  a 
mark-up over labor costs. By defining  Y W /  as the labor share in income,  N as the 
level of employed workers and  Y N b / = ,  we have the labor share in income as a 
function of the mark-up level, 
m p bw pY wN Y W + = = = 1 / 1 / / /     (4) 
and the capitalists’ share in income  Y R h / =  will be,   6 
m m Y W pY wN pY Y R h + = − = − = = 1 / / 1 / ) ( /    (5) 
Expressions  (3),  (4)  and  (5)  give  us  the  traditional  distributive  relations.  For  given 
productivity levels, there is an inverse relationship between mark-ups and real wages. 
The higher the mark ups, the lower the real wages and the higher the share of profits in 
income h. 
It is important to introduce at this point a crucial, but fairly ignored, issue: the role of 
real exchange rate levels on the determination of real wages and profitability in the short 
run and, thus, in the distributive relations. As discussed in the previous section, the 
more overvalued the domestic currency is, the higher real wages will be in so far as the 
prices of tradable consumption goods, especially commodities, will go down alongside 
with  the  appreciation.  If  we  assume  that  workers  receive  a  nominal  wage  w  and 
consume  tradable  and  non  tradable  goods,  their  cost  of  living  will  depend  on  the 
nominal exchange rate level and on the share of tradable goods in their consumption 
basket. According to this kind of reasoning, real wages and profits will, thus, depend on 
the  level  of  the  real  exchange  rate,  besides  the  patterns  of  income  distribution  and 
productivity levels. 
If we assume that the price level can be defined as an average of tradable  pt and non 
tradable  pnt prices, 
pnt pt p ) 1 ( α α − + =     (6) 
and, further assuming that tradable prices in domestic terms are exogenously determined 
by the nominal exchange rate level e and international prices  * p ,  
e p pt * =     (7) 
we can see how profitability and the real wage will depend on the real exchange rate 
level (defined as the ratio of tradable to non tradable prices) using again the mark-up 
pricing rule (3), 
1 } / } ) 1 ( ) * {{( − − + = bw pnt e p m α α        (8) 
A devaluation of the exchange rate, causing increases in tradable prices as compared to 
the nominal wage, means a reduction in real wages and an increase in profits as long as 
eventual  increases  in  w  due  to  the  devaluation  are  lower  than  the  increases  in  the 
nominal  exchange  rate,  for  given  international  price  levels.  This  usually  happens  if 
nominal wages remain constant or move slower than prices of goods. We are, thus, 
assuming  here  the  hypothesis  of  nominal  wage  rigidity  and  real  wage  flexibility  as 
opposed to nominal flexibility and real rigidity.  
By assuming that workers don’t save, as Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) do, we can then 
conclude that higher real wages and appreciated currencies are associated with lower 
saving rates and higher consumption levels. As a consequence, aggregate demand can 
increase or decrease because of higher real wages, depending on the effects of lower 
profit margins on aggregate investment. If, following Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), we 
define an investment function that depends only on profit margins:   7 
) (h I I =                         (9) 
0 / > ∂ ∂ h I                      (9.1) 
Equilibrium in the goods market is achieved by the traditional savings = investment 
identity, in other terms an IS curve: 
) (h I shz =                       (10) 
Capacity utilization levels will vary as a function of profit margins according to the 
following derivative:  
sh sz I h z h / ) ( / − = ∂ ∂       (11) 
0 / > ∂ ∂ = h I Ih                 (11.1) 
As  sh is always positive, capacity utilization will increase or decrease depending on 
) ( sz Ih − . If investment is inelastic to changes in profit margins, real wage falls will be 
recessionary because decreases in consumption will not be compensated for increases in 
investment  ) ( sz Ih < . This is the classical under-consumptionist thesis, where low real 
wages lead to low consumption and aggregate demand. On the other hand, real wage 
increases will be expansionary compensating for low investment levels. This kind of 
“consumption-led” growth, can, nevertheless, be problematic in the long run because of 
installed capacity constraints. If investment is elastic to profit margins, we have the 
opposite  effect.  Lower  real  wages  will  increase  profit  margins  and  investment, 
stimulating aggregate demand, capacity utilization and savings. Growth will then be 
“investment-led”.  
Building  up  on  this  simple  model,  Bhaduri  and  Marglin  (1990)  introduce  capacity 
utilization  as  a  direct  determinant  of  investment  levels.  Responses  of  aggregate 
investment  depend  now  on  capacity  utilization  z   and  on  profit  margins  and  profit 
shares in income h, which leads to a new goods market equilibrium: 
  0 , 0 ), , ( > > = z h I I z h I I         (12) 
) , ( z h I shz =                             (13) 
) /( ) ( / z h I sh sz I h z − − = ∂ ∂      (14) 
By  imposing  the  Keynesian  condition  that  equilibrium  in  goods  market  is  achieved 
through changes in savings rather than investment  0 ) ( > − z I sh , they arrive at the same 
qualitative  conclusions  of  the  simple  case  where  investment  depends  only  on  profit 
margins and profit shares in income  h. In a final step Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) 
extend the model to the open economy case with real exports  e X  and imports  m X  that 
depend respectively on the real exchange rate θ  and on capacity utilization  z , with the 
following elasticities: 
e e e X d dX η θ θ = ) / )( / (        (15)   8 
m m m X d dX η θ θ − = ) / )( / (    (16) 
u X z z X m m = ∂ ∂ ) / )( / (          (17) 
In the new goods market equilibrium total savings plus imports in nominal terms  M  
equals total investment plus exports in nominal terms E  
E z h I M shz + = + ) , (           (18) 
The partial derivative of capacity utilization  z  with respect to profit margins and profit 
share h is very similar to the closed economy case (11): 
) )( ( / z h I sh gu sz I h z − + − = ∂ ∂    (19) 
where  g  represents the initial share of imports and exports over GDP and  u  is the 
elasticity  of  imports  with  respect  to  capacity  utilization.  By  assuming  that 
0 ) ( > − + z I sh gu , we arrive again at the same conclusions of the simple case. 
In the open economy case, a real devaluation decreases the real wage and increases 
profit  margins,  for  given  productivity  levels.  Income,  exports  and  investment  will 
increase as long as those two macro functions are sufficiently elastic. In the case of 
exports  and  imports,  the  overall  effect  on  external  accounts  will  be  positive  if  the 
Marshall-Lerner  condition  holds,  an  assumption  used  throughout  the  whole  paper 
) 1 ( > + m e η η .  
To sum up, this simple model presents possible responses of a system to exogenous 
variations in real wages and exchange rates from a broad Keynesian perspective. The 
real  exchange  rate  plays  an  important  role  in  the  capital  accumulation  process  by 
defining real wages and profits. The model is mainly worried about short run issues, 
when  productivity  is  held  constant.  For  given  productivity  levels,  a  competitive 
currency tends to stimulate investment and exports. When productivity increases in the 
long run, there is pressure for the real exchange rate to appreciate because wages and 
prices of non tradables go up. So if the strategy works, there is always the tendency of 
the exchange rate to  appreciate as a consequence of increases in per capita income 
(Balassa-Samuelson effect).   
Overvaluations, undervaluations and growth 
Currency misalignment measures are far from consensual. Two methods of dealing with 
the  problem  are  the  most  popular:  purchasing  power  estimates  and  “fundamental” 
exchange rate equilibriums. The first one is based on PPP comparisons, usually adjusted 
for  the  Balassa-Samuelson  effect,  and  considers  high  international  price  levels  as  a 
proxy for overvaluations for a given real GDP per capita level. The second method 
takes into account internal and external conditions (capacity utilization and balance of 
payment  financing  conditions  for  a  given  state  of  variables)  when  measuring   9 
“fundamental”  exchange  rate  equilibriums  and  considers  low  growth  levels  or 
unsustainable current account trajectories as possible signs of misalignment
12. 
In misalignments measured as PPP deviations with Balassa-Samuelson adjustments, a 
currency is regarded to be in a “wrong” position if prices in international comparisons 
are too high as compared to what they should be if per capita income levels are taken 
into account
13. Per capita income levels can be taken as proxies for productivity levels 
and,  thus,  as  good  measures  for  non-tradables  remuneration,  especially  labor,  as 
compared to tradables. A “correct” exchange rate in terms of PPP deviations would 
align real wages with productivity levels. Overvalued currencies would be associated 
with excessively high real wages and foreign indebtedness or high trade protectionism. 
An equilibrium real exchange rate would, thus, be associated with adequate real wage 
levels according to per capita income. 
For  the  second  method,  an  equilibrium  exchange  rate  would  be  associated  with 
reasonable growth and sustainable external debt, in other terms, to full employment 
(internal  balance)  and  proper  current  account  financing  (external  balance).  This 
“equilibrium” usually depends on several other macro variables, such as: i) terms of 
trade, ii) domestic and international interest rates, iii) tariffs, iv) international transfers 
and aid, v) capital controls, vi) government spending and vii) productivity shifts. An 
increase in international interest rates, worsening terms of trade and lower tariffs or 
transfers and aid tend to depreciate the currency. An opening of capital accounts, an 
increase in government spending in non-tradables and productivity increases tend to 
appreciate the currency
14. 
In this paper we present new econometric evidence for the exchange rate levels and 
growth relation based on PPP deviations. In line with other works in the literature, the 
results here show a negative relationship between growth and overvaluations for a panel 
with  58  developing  countries  from  1960  until  1999  using  PPP  measures.  The 
estimations also adopt a new overvaluation index that takes into account variations in 
real per capita incomes, adjusting, thus, traditional exchange rate estimates for the so-
called Balassa-Samuelson effect
15. By correcting traditional real exchange rate annual 
estimates for GDP per capita increases, the index controls the data for appreciations due 
to productivity increases
16. 
The prime source for the panel data analysis that follows is the database compiled by 
Easterly (2005). Real exchange rate levels are measured by the computations of Easterly 
(2001) following Dollar’s (1992) work as  explained below. GDP levels and  growth 
rates are computed from the World Bank database. The sample contains 58 developing 
countries with average per capita income between approximately 500 and 7.000 PPP US 
dollars in the period that goes from 1960 until 1999. If the lower bound for inclusion in 
the  sample  were  below  500  dollars,  many  African  countries  which  experienced 
significant exchange rate appreciation would be left outside the sample. If the bound 
was set above 7.000 PPP dollars, many countries that are now considered developed 
would be included. From a grand total of 58 countries, 23 are from Africa, 19 from 
Latin  America  and  Caribbean,  13  from  Asia  and  Middle  East  and  3  from  Europe. 
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Besides the selection based on per capita income levels, data availability was also taken 
into account. 
The following figure shows – on a logarithmic scale – a scatter plot of per capita GDP 
growth rates and real exchange rate levels for the mentioned countries from 1960 until 
1999. The averages were computed according to data availability. The data shows that 
for  the  period  average,  countries  with  relatively  overvalued  real  exchange  rates 
presented lower per capita income growth rates. The African countries tend to cluster on 
the  right-hand  side  of  the  figure,  presenting  relative  overvaluation  and  the  Asian 
countries on the left-hand side, showing relative undervaluation. 















* elaborated by the author based on Easterly (2001) 
Control variables chosen for the econometric analysis can be classified into two groups: 
structural and macroeconomic. The first group represents the well known variables of 
the economic growth literature and includes proxies for human capital, physical and 
institutional  infrastructures.  The  second  group  uses  variables  from  a  more  recent 
literature that tries to correlate short-run variables with long-run economic results. On 
that group, we have selected inflation rates, capacity utilization – or product gap – and 
terms of trade shocks. 
The  first  variable  on  the  structural  group  is  related  to  current  investment  in  human 
capital, which is considered to be a production factor, as well as having effects on total   11 
factor productivity. This is measured from data on the gross rate of secondary school 
enrolment, according to the tradition in the literature. The second structural variable to 
be used tries to measure public infrastructure availability. The results relating higher 
growth rates to better infrastructure are also well-known on the empirical literature. 
Given  the  difficulties  on  data  collection  in  this  area,  data  on  telecommunications 
infrastructure,  measured  as  the  number  of  per  capita  phone  lines  as  computed  in 
Fajnzylber et al (2002), was used. It seems reasonable to use this variable as a proxy for 
physical infrastructure since the literature documents a high correlation between per 
capita phone lines and other infrastructure measures such as transport and energy. The 
third  structural  variable  refers  to  the  quality  of  the  institutional  environment,  which 
should be directly connected to production and investment conditions. The index used is 
computed by Political Risk Services (International Country Risk Guide – ICRG) which 
includes  the  following  variables:  rule  of  law,  quality  of  bureaucracy,  absence  of 
corruption and the level of accountability of public servants. Population growth was 
also  used  as  a  control  variable  in  the  regressions  following  several  works  in  the 
literature. 
Regarding macro-environment variables, the first one is related to price level stability. 
The yearly average inflation level is taken as an indication of macroeconomic stability. 
The second one, “Initial GDP gap”, gives a measure of idle installed capacity or output 
gap.  The  lower  the  activity  level,  the  greater  are  the  opportunities  for  increases  in 
income and production due to a greater use of already existing capital and labour stocks. 
The  variable  terms  of  trade  shocks  captures  the  positive  –  or  negative  –  effects  of 
international trade which can be translated into changes on GDP growth rates. Data on 
both the product gap and terms of trade are from Fajnzylber et al (2002). Finally, the 
most  important  variable  for  this  paper  measures  the  degree  of  overvaluation  of  the 
national currency using an adjusted series based on Easterly (2001). 
William Easterly (2001) builds a series of real exchange rates from 1960 until 1999 for 
developed  and  developing  countries.  The  author  applies,  initially,  the  traditional 
methodology for calculations of the real exchange rate: (Domestic CPI)/(Exchange Rate 
Domestic Currency to per Dollar*US CPI). To make the series of different countries 
fairly comparable, he centers his results in index numbers using the values found by 
Dollar (1992). For each country, the author benchmarks the series of index numbers in 
order to make the averages for the period 1976-1985 equal to Dollar’s work
17. A real 
exchange rate of 100 in Easterly´s (2001) series means a position exactly equivalent to a 
PPP exchange rate adjusted for the per capita income of the country between the years 
1976-1985 using Dollar’s methodology, in other words, a “neutral” exchange rate. An 
index  higher  than  100  means  relative  appreciation  and  lower  than  100  relative 
undervaluation.  
Dollar  (1992)  uses  Heston  and  Summers’  PPP  estimations  to  calculate  relative 
international price levels for 95 developing countries from 1976 until 1985. The author 
compares local prices measured in dollars using current nominal exchange rates with 
prices in dollars in the United States. If prices are the same, the exchange rate is said to 
be in a neutral position. If prices are higher (lower) there might be some overvaluation 
(undervaluation). As Dollar (1992) argues, those estimates have to take into account the 
fact that prices of non tradables in poorer countries tend to be lower because of lower 
wages. Thus, overvaluation or undervaluation has to be analyzed in terms of relative per 
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capita income levels. Following Dollar (1992), we adjust Easterly’s (2001) index for the 
estimations to consider changes in productivity levels (proxied by per capita incomes) 
for all years since 1960. According to the arguments presented on the previous sections, 
we expect overvalued real exchange rates to be related to lower GDP growth rates due 
to  their  short-run  problems  (balance  of  payments  crises),  as  well  as  their  long-run 
negative  effects  (low  investment,  lack  of  technological  innovations  and  productivity 
growth as in Dutch disease cases). 
Finally, the initial per capita income level was used as an additional regressor following 
the conditional convergence hypothesis of the economic growth literature. Given the 
same  macroeconomic  and  structural  characteristics  (such  as  human  capital,  inflation 
levels, etc...), countries with higher per capita PPP incomes are expected to grow less 
due to decreasing marginal returns on the capital stock. All variables on the estimations, 
except product gap, terms of trade shocks and per capita income growth rates, were 
subject  to  the  logarithmic  transformation.  Despite  the  care  in  selecting  countries 
regarding data availability, the final panel database was unbalanced since data could not 
be found for all countries in all years. The main estimation procedure was done using 
five year averages. 
The  econometric  framework  used  follows  the  traditional  literature  of  growth 
regressions
18. GDP per capita growth rate is the dependent variable, which is expected 
to depend on a vector of variables representing growth determinants  t i X , , together with 
the initial GDP per capita levels  t i Y ,  for each country  i on a given time period  t. The 
estimated  model  follows  the  traditional  specification  in  which  n  is  the  number  of 
periods included: 
t i t i t i t i t i X Y n Y Y , , 2 , 1 0 , 1 , ) ln( / )) ln( ) (ln( ε β β β + + + = − +     (20) 
The main advantage of panel data estimation is that it allows both the cross-sectional 
and time series characteristics of the sample to be exploited. However, some care must 
be  taken  regarding  estimation  problems  on  growth  regressions.  Among  the  possible 
pitfalls,  it  is  important  to  single  out  the  endogeneity  problem  posed  by  Bond  et  al 
(2001). By using the initial level of per capita income on the right hand side of equation 
(20) for convergence analyses, this model ends up using the dependent variable as one 
of the regressors, causing possible biases on the estimators. An additional problem lies 
on the use of the per capita income level as a proxy for productivity differentials in 
order to adjust the level of real overvaluation. Thus, panel estimates, with either fixed or 
random effects for modelling the unobserved heterogeneity are expected to be biased. 
To avoid those problems, the following specification expressed in first differences with 
GMM estimation was used. The left-hand side of the equation represents per capita 
income  growth  rates  for  each  period  analyzed,  µ   captures  time  specific  effects,  η 
country specific effects, and  t i, ε  represents the idiosyncratic errors. 
t i i t t i t i t i t i X Y Y Y , , 2 , 1 , 1 , ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ε η µ β β + + + + = − +    (21) 
                                                 
18 for some examples, see Acemoglu (2002) and Fajnzylber et al (2002)    13 
The  results  are  in  table  1  and  2  in  the  appendix.  Generalized  Method  of  Moments 
(GMM) was the estimation technique used because it is flexible enough to deal with the 
measurement  errors  and  endogeneity  problems,  as  in  Bond  et  al  (2001).  Following 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), GMM system estimators 
were also used. They are expected to outperform the GMM difference estimator when 
the instruments present a high degree of persistence. In those cases, lagged differences 
tend to be poor instruments, leading to unreliable estimates for the GMM difference 
estimators. All standard errors presented in the results (table 1 in the appendix) – for 
both the system and difference GMM estimates – are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of arbitrary form. As for the choice of variables, the initial output gap 
for each five year period and terms of trade growth were included as exogenous, and the 
other ones were assumed to be endogenous, for which their own lags were used as 
instruments. 
The estimates using the real exchange rate with productivity adjustments a la Balassa-
Samuelson are in accordance to what we expected (table 1 in the appendix); the initial 
per capita income presents a significant negative sign on all estimated models. As for 
the structural variables, the coefficient associated with the schooling variable presents a 
positive sign, significant on the GMM-sys estimates. On the case of the macroeconomic 
variables, both inflation and the output gap present coefficients with the expected signs 
on GMM system estimation. Terms of trade are positively related to per capita income 
growth rates, and exchange rate overvaluation is negatively related to per capita income 
growth. The coefficients for the time dummies point to a decrease in growth rates on 
recent years.  
As  a  check  for  the  model’s  adequacy,  the  Sargan  test  for  orthogonality  of  the 
instruments and error terms was used. The p-values of the tests indicate both models – 
system and difference GMM estimators – as adequate; however, the difference on the 
Sargan statistics point out to the superiority of the GMM system estimator as compared 
to  the  GMM  difference  estimator.  The  models  were  also  estimated  without  the 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation corrections, reaching closer results to the ones 
presented  by  Fajnzylber  et  al  (2002)  (table  2  in  the  Appendix).  Several  other 
specifications with the control variables were also tried and relevant differences in the 
results in terms of sign and significance of the variables were not found.  
The estimates using real exchange rates with and without adjustments for productivity 
differentials (proxied by per capita income differentials), show that both the absolute 
value and the significance of the coefficient associated with overvaluations are relevant. 
This indicates that real exchange rate levels may have an important impact on real per 
capita income growth rates. The estimated coefficients for this variable are negative, 
ranging between 0.0111 and 0.0153 and highly significant. This implies that if the real 
exchange rate happens to be 10 percentage points more devalued, everything else being 
constant,  real  per  capita  income  average  growth  rates  could  be  up  to 
0.0153*10/100=0.00153 or 0,153% higher.  
Latin America versus East Asia 
According to the arguments presented above, a central issue to understanding the East 
and Southeast Asian successes, as compared to the Latin American and African failures 
in  the  last  30  years,  might  be  in  the  way  they  have  conducted  their  exchange  rate   14 
policies and, thus, in their real exchange rate levels. When discussing the impacts of the 
debt  crisis  in  Latin  America  and  East  Asia  in  the  beginning  of  the  eighties,  Sachs 
(1985), for example, concludes that the superior adjustment of the Asian countries took 
place mainly because of their better exchange rate and trade regimes. Except for the 
case of the Philippines, none of the high performing Asian economies has defaulted on 
external debt, a very different situation as compared to Latin America. According to the 
author,  these  two  regions  had  3  common  and  1  distinct  characteristic  that  was 
responsible for their rather smooth transition in the debt crisis. In terms of external debt, 
the  Asian  countries  had  practically  the  Latin  American  levels.  South  Korea,  for 
example, had a total external debt over GDP of 27,6% in 1981, higher than the Brazilian 
level of 26,1% for the same year. When it comes to terms of trade, the author argues 
that some of the Asian countries have had even worse shocks than the Latin American 
countries. Regarding state intervention, Sachs argues that both regions went through a 
process of some form of State-led development. 
The great difference between these two macro regions is then to be found on “trade 
regime and exchange rate management”. While Latin America focused on an inward-
looking industrialization strategy with a strong bias for currency appreciations, East and 
Southeast Asian countries pursued an export-led growth strategy, with heavy stimulus 
for the export sector through subsidies and competitive exchange rates. The reason for 
the better adjustment of East Asia in the debt crisis would then be in the existence of an 
ample and dynamic tradable sector, capable of producing the so needed hard currency 
when  the  day  of  the  reckoning  came.  This  difference  can  be  easily  seen  when  we 
compare the exports over external debt ratio for both regions in the beginning of the 
eighties. Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand had on average an index of 
0,821 in 1981 as compared to an average index of 2,715 for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela in the same year
19.  
While  Latin  American  countries  went  through  their  well-known  populist  and 
stabilization episodes during the eighties and nineties, East Asian countries focused on 
their export-led growth strategy, especially after the Plaza accords, with a permanent 
stimulus for their export sector avoiding episodes of strong appreciations since the debt 
crisis.  Whilst  the  former  have  used  exchange  rates  prominently  as  a  populist  or 
stabilization  tool,  the  latter  have  targeted  their  exchange  rate  policies  in  search  for 
external  demand,  following  their  development  strategy.  Regarding  the  1997  Asian 
crisis, it is worth mentioning that the appreciation of some of the currencies in the 
region in 1996 and 1997 strongly contributed to the collapse. As Lim (2004) puts it, 
those  countries,  “in  varying  degrees,  had  a  tendency  to  incur  high  deficits  in  their 
current account and overvalue their currency. This last was what made the East Asian 
countries eventually “un-East Asian” since the earlier East Asian stereotype was a high 
saver and a high earner of foreign exchange”
20. 
Another  main  difference  between  these  two  regions  is,  then,  to  be  found  on  their 
savings  and  investment  levels.  East  Asia  is  well  known  for  its  very  high  levels  of 
investment  and  savings,  whereas  Latin  American  countries  are  famous  for  their 
excessive consumption and lack of savings. As we have shown above, it is possible to 
argue  from  a  broad  Keynesian  perspective  that  competitive  currencies  can  also  be 
associated with high levels of savings and investment. The stylized facts found in East 
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Asia regarding savings and investment patterns can, thus, be interpreted from this point 
of  view,  provided  that  the  conditions  adopted  by  the  model  presented  above  hold. 
Undervalued  currencies  may  have  produced  investment-led  growth  patterns  in  Asia 
whereas overvalued currencies may have contributed to instability and consumption-led 
growth cycles in Latin America. 
The  general  empirical  findings  of  this  paper  also  point  out  to the  relevance  of  real 
exchange rate levels and policy to GDP per capita growth rates. The results are in line 
with the old econometric evidence that reports the shortcomings of overvaluations for 
long  term  growth.  These  findings  support,  thus,  several  case  studies  that  show  the 
connections between competitive currencies and high growth in East Asia as opposed to 
the Latin American and African problematic experiences with overvaluations in the last 
30 years.  
Regarding East Asian countries, we do not claim here that exchange rate policy alone 
tells the whole story, but we think that the articulation of industrial and trade policies 
together with what some authors call a pro-investment economic policy (low interest 
rates and competitive currencies) are  a big part of the story. Regarding inflationary 
processes in Latin American, it’s true that the recent story of the continent has been one 
of overvaluations, devaluations and crises due to economic populism and stabilization 
plans based on exchange rate anchors. In that regard, what we argue for here is the 
avoidance of overvaluations which are very costly to correct, especially in terms of 
inflationary consequences of devaluations.  
This is not to say, of course, that programming the real exchange rate is an easy task. In 
cases of full employment or excessive aggregate demand there is high probability that 
nominal devaluations will lead to higher prices, neutralizing real devaluations. For a 
nominal  devaluation  to  work,  unemployment  (or  surplus  labor)  and  relative  price 
stickiness have to be assumed, so that exports and investment can react to the new set of 
relative prices without triggering an inflationary process. Even if that’s the case, in an 
open capital account environment there might be other difficulties as Frenkel and Taylor 
(2006) show. In face of free capital flows, it might be even harder for the central bank to 
manage the nominal exchange rate because of interest rates arbitrages. The discussion 
of all those issues would, unfortunately, require another paper. Our main point here was 
related to the negative (or positive) effects of real exchange rate levels on growth as a 
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Appendix  
Table 1 – Overvaluations and growth (Robust) 
Dependent variable: p/capita growth rates      M.Q.O. pool  Fixed Effects  GMM-DIFF  GMM-SYS 
         
Initial GDP per capita  -0.0208***  -0.0753***  -0.0698***  -0.0456** 
                  (-4.4760)  (-8.4897)  (-3.6041)  (-2.7261) 
Initial Output Gap  -0.1028*  -0.1098*  -0.1830***  -0.1772** 
                  (-2.1985)  (-2.4021)  (-3.4430)  (-2.7505) 
Education         0.0117***  0.0028  0.0011  0.0209* 
                  (3.8613)  (0.4804)  (0.0768)  (2.1486) 
Public Infrastructure  0.0077**  0.0209***  0.0310  0.0266* 
                  (3.1896)  (3.6915)  (1.6492)  (2.1848) 
Governance        0.0044***  0.0040  -0.0027  0.0050 
                  (3.3654)  (1.9253)  (-0.6868)  (1.3169) 
Lack of Price Stability  -0.0149***  -0.0120***  -0.0102  -0.0154 
                  (-4.8950)  (-3.6655)  (-1.8065)  (-1.6718) 
Exchange Rate Overvaluation (adjusted)  -0.0121***  -0.0174***  -0.0089  -0.0153** 
                  (-4.3960)  (-4.2385)  (-1.0164)  (-2.6281) 
Terms of Trade Shocks  0.0447  0.0449  0.0439  0.0411 
                  (1.5800)  (1.7495)  (1.3194)  (1.2928) 
Population growth  -0.2309  -0.1664  0.6523  1.1928 
                  (-1.2505)  (-0.5222)  (0.6448)  (1.5563) 
Years 66-70      -0.0018  0.0062  0.0076  -0.0037 
                  (-0.2572)  (0.9582)  (1.0577)  (-0.8411) 
Years 71-75      -0.0038  0.0059  0.0051  -0.0117 
                  (-0.5503)  (0.8407)  (0.4127)  (-1.6269) 
Years 76-80      -0.0102  0.0075  0.0061  -0.0154 
                  (-1.4617)  (0.8818)  (0.3261)  (-1.4271) 
Years 81-85      -0.0296***  -0.0092  -0.0105  -0.0376*** 
                  (-4.3898)  (-0.9870)  (-0.4799)  (-4.7894) 
Years 86-90      -0.0193**  -0.0039  -0.0058  -0.0324*** 
                  (-2.8844)  (-0.3836)  (-0.2288)  (-4.2497) 
Years 91-95      -0.0254***  -0.0115  -0.0111  -0.0452*** 
                  (-3.6885)  (-0.9830)  (-0.3612)  (-5.0167) 
Years 96-99      -0.0283***  -0.0148  -0.0175  -0.0508*** 
                  (-3.9879)  (-1.1153)  (-0.4894)  (-4.4281) 
Constant         0.2613***  0.6620***    0.3627** 
                  (7.1769)  (9.2520)    (2.9970) 
         
N-Obs             341  341  281  341 
R-sq              0.370  0.387     
Sargan                42.087  35.180 
Sargan-p-val          0.191  0.998 
Sargan DF             35.000  62.000 
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Table 2 - Overvaluations and growth 
Dependent variable: p/capita growth rates      M.Q.O. pool  Fixed Effects  GMM-DIFF  GMM-SYS 
         
Initial GDP per capita  -0.0177***  -0.0588***  -0.0633**  -0.0318*** 
                  (-3.8761)  (-7.2482)  (-3.1364)  (-3.9114) 
Initial Output Gap  -0.1002*  -0.1471**  -0.2001***  -0.1462*** 
                  (-2.1239)  (-3.1667)  (-3.9553)  (-3.4627) 
Education         0.0110***  0.0016  -0.0063  0.0209*** 
                  (3.5901)  (0.2660)  (-0.5051)  (4.5294) 
Public Infrastructure  0.0068**  0.0204***  0.0262  0.0215*** 
                  (2.8214)  (3.4696)  (1.5144)  (3.3398) 
Governance        0.0044**  0.0038  -0.0036  0.0041* 
                  (3.2963)  (1.7692)  (-1.0855)  (1.9724) 
Lack of Price Stability  -0.0160***  -0.0145***  -0.0128*  -0.0197*** 
                  (-5.2639)  (-4.3535)  (-2.0163)  (-5.0448) 
Exchange Rate Overvaluation  -0.0117***  -0.0052  0.0058  -0.0111** 
                  (-3.6625)  (-1.2400)  (0.7326)  (-3.1362) 
Terms of Trade Shocks  0.0462  0.0553*  0.0605*  0.0391** 
                  (1.6176)  (2.0995)  (2.0324)  (2.9029) 
Population growth  -0.3188  -0.2002  0.8255  1.0384** 
                  (-1.7376)  (-0.6101)  (0.9648)  (2.6184) 
Years 66-70      -0.0015  0.0056  0.0113  -0.0041 
                  (-0.2179)  (0.8414)  (1.3872)  (-1.6785) 
Years 71-75      -0.0032  0.0046  0.0121  -0.0113*** 
                  (-0.4653)  (0.6379)  (0.9847)  (-3.5994) 
Years 76-80      -0.0093  0.0046  0.0141  -0.0153*** 
                  (-1.3189)  (0.5195)  (0.8237)  (-3.5441) 
Years 81-85      -0.0287***  -0.0112  0.0022  -0.0383*** 
                  (-4.2236)  (-1.1499)  (0.1055)  (-10.9477) 
Years 86-90      -0.0195**  -0.0061  0.0098  -0.0316*** 
                  (-2.8804)  (-0.5699)  (0.3902)  (-8.3012) 
Years 91-95      -0.0256***  -0.0130  0.0084  -0.0432*** 
                  (-3.6790)  (-1.0444)  (0.2772)  (-8.6943) 
Years 96-99      -0.0285***  -0.0176  0.0044  -0.0477*** 
                  (-3.9793)  (-1.2536)  (0.1221)  (-7.7964) 
Constant       0.2475***  0.5000***    0.2740*** 
                  (6.7925)  (8.0758)    (4.5833) 
         
N-Obs             341  341  281  341 
R-sq              0.359  0.350     
Sargan                54.650  32.142 
Sargan-p-val          0.018  0.999 
Sargan DF             35.000  62.000 
P-val Autocorr.1      0.000  0.000 
P-val Autocorr.2      0.544  0.510 
         
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001         